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Abstract
This paper provides a bargaining model of conict in which the govern-
ment oers a transfer to an opposition group to avoid civil war. Members
of the opposition are heterogeneous in income and ideology, and hetero-
geneity generates disagreement about whether to accept the government's
oer. We assume the probability that government's oer avoids conict
increases continuously with the number of opposition group members who
agree to accept it. When the within-group heterogeneity is large, the num-
ber of members receptive to the government's oer is less responsive to an
increase in transfer level. In this situation, the government must raise its
transfer substantially to attract support among the opposition. As peace
becomes more costly for the government, negotiations are likely to break
down.
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1 Introduction
According to Blattman and Miguel (2010), 20 % of the world's countries were
engaged in civil war for at least 10 years during 1960-2006. Civil war threatens
human rights and welfare and damages economies.1
Since the seminal study of Collier and Hoeer (1998), many studies have
found a negative relation between the per capita income and the risk of civil
war.2 In contrast, most empirical studies nd no signicant relation between
economic inequality and the risk of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and
Hoeer 2004). However, recent empirical studies cite \within-group" inequal-
ity, not overall inequality, as a signicant cause of civil war. Using subnational
data for sub-Saharan Africa, stby et al. (2009) nd that intra-regional in-
equality in household assets and education positively aects the onset of a civil
conict. As the failure of negotiations between Israel and Palestine during the
1990s suggests, heterogeneity in ideology within group members also aects the
likelihood of conict. Although Israel{Palestine negotiations began with bilat-
eral popular support, the extremist Palestinian faction Hamas hindered them
by attacks against Israel (Kydd and Walter 2002).
This paper presents a bargaining model of a civil conict that illustrates
the manner in which within-group heterogeneity hinders peace negotiations and
leads to the outbreak of costly conicts. Our model follows the standard en-
vironment in the literature of bargaining models of conict. If the government
and an opposition group initiate civil war, both bear its cost, but the winner
deprives the loser of a portion of its resources. The government has little to
gain and much to lose from civil war, and it can thus oers the opposition
group transfers to avoid civil war. If the opposition accepts the government's
oer, war is avoided. As per Fearon (1995), as long as each group is treated
as a unitary player, conict can be avoided via negotiation because there is no
private information, issue indivisibility, or commitment problem.
We extend the standard bargaining model of conict by introducing het-
erogeneity in the opposition group and explicitly consider the manner in which
conicting interests among members in the opposing group aect the outcome
of bargaining. Income is the opportunity cost of war and ideology is the payo
from waging war (e.x., antagonism toward the government). Due to their het-
erogeneity, members of the opposition group have dierent preferences for civil
war, and whether the opposition group accepts the government's oer depends
on the distribution of members' preferences. Therefore, within-group hetero-
geneity matters for the outbreak of a civil conict.
Although many studies treat groups involved in conict as unitary players,
1See, for example, Rodrik (1999) and Cerra and Saxena (2008).
2Using the quantity of rainfall as an instrument, Miguel et al. (2004) show that poverty
exerts causal eects on the risks of civil war.
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Jackson and Morelli (2007) analyze a situation wherein the net value of conict
for a pivotal decision-maker diers from that for the entire group. The discrep-
ancy between the pivotal agent's and the group's net values is represented as
\political bias" in their paper, and they show that negotiations cannot forestall
conict if the political bias is large.
We present a benchmark model based on an argument similar to that in
Jackson and Morelli (2007) to show that extensive within-group income inequal-
ity raises the prospect of civil war if the opposition group makes decisions by
majority rule. Although our analysis shows the link between within-group het-
erogeneity and the onset of conict, the assumption of the majority rule is not
plausible in the context of civil war. More importantly, although the benchmark
model assumes that only pivotal agents aect the outcomes of a peace process,
as the failure of Israel{Palestine negotiations indicates, a faction opposed to
peace can derail negotiations.
In the main part of this paper, we consider the likelihood that negotiations
are unsuccessful when a faction in one of the negotiating parties opposes peace.
Specically, we assume that the probability of negotiations failing increases
continuously as the number of members who reject the government's oer rises.
The greater the number of opponents, the greater is their inuence on the peace
process. Hence, the probability of civil war increases as their number increases.
Under this assumption, we argue that extensive heterogeneity within an op-
position group leads to the onset of civil war by the following mechanism. The
net payo to each member of the opposition from accepting the government's of-
fer depends on his/her heterogeneous characteristics, and the payo increases as
the amount oered by the government increases. Government can bolster sup-
port for peace by increasing the amount of transfer oered, which can reduce
the risk of a civil conict. However, when heterogeneity within the opposition is
large, member preferences are dispersed and the support for the peace process
is less responsive to any change in the proposed transfer. Then, the govern-
ment's marginal cost from increasing support for the peace process increases.
In this situation, the government oers the opposition a small transfer, and the
equilibrium probability of peace is small.3
This paper is related to Esteban and Ray (2011), who show that greater
inequalities in within-group income are associated with more intense conicts. In
their model, the poor commit their time to conicts, whereas the rich contribute
money. When the intra-group income inequality is large, the group's poorer
members face lower opportunity costs by participating in the conict and the
wealthier members contribute more money to it. However, determining the
3This mechanism is similar to the probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987;
Dixit and Londregan 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000). Mizuno et al. (2012) use a similar
mechanism to analyze the relations among inequality, institutions, and growth in a dictator-
ship.
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reason for the opposing groups to undertake costly conicts exceeds the scope
of their analysis.
Understanding the reason behind not being able to avoid costly conict by
negotiation is a major issue in earlier literature, and most studies cite private
information and commitment problems as factors underlying failed negotiations
(Fearon 1995, Powell 1999, 2002, 2006). The role of transfer (or inclusive poli-
cies) to avoid conict is studied in Azam (1995), Azam and Mesnard (2003),
Haimanko et al. (2005), and Reynal-Querol (2005), but these papers neither
examine within-group heterogeneity nor do their analyses on the basis of bar-
gaining models.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the anecdotal
illustrations of peace processes that collapse through internal opposition. In
Section 3, we explain our model. In Section 4, we consider the case wherein the
opposition group's decision to accept the government's oer is made by a pivotal
internal agent. In Section 5, we present the study's primary contribution. In
Section 6, we conclude the study.
2 Examples of Collapsed Peace Processes
This study's major ndings arise from the primary assumption that peace pro-
cesses are more likely to collapse under dissension within the opposition group.
This assumption reects that accords between governments and opposition
groups can collapse when a faction of members opposes it. This section presents
three illustrations supporting this assumption. All three show the signicance
of within-group heterogeneity in political preferences on outcomes. More im-
portantly, they demonstrate that decisions formalized during negotiations can
be overthrown by factions who reject them.
2.1 Israel and the Palestinian Authority
Although peaceful resolution to the conict between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (PA) had been sought during the 1990s, negotiations under the Oslo
accords failed. Signed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat,
the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, the Oslo
accords declared mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO and established a
framework for interim self-government in Gaza and the West Bank and nal-
status negotiations.
Although most Israelis and Palestinians welcomed early negotiations, oppo-
sition within both camps was strong. Hamas, an opposing Palestinian faction,
launched several attacks against Israel to impede negotiations. In particular,
attacks after Arafat's 1996 election victory killed 102 people, eroded Israeli
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popular support, and maimed negotiations. This shift in public opinion ousted
Israel's Labor government and installed the hawkish Likud government in 1996
and impeded the peace process (Kydd and Walter 2002).
The retrogression of peace indicated Arafat's inability to control internal
opposition. Although numerous Palestinians supported him, strong Palestinian
opposition revealed \the limits of Arafat's ability to win over the Palestinian
street" (Eisenberg and Caplan 2010:216). Obstruction by a violent faction can
provoke distrust in negotiating partners and impeding negotiations. As Eisen-
berg and Caplan (2010:186) note, \The PA's reluctance or inability to crush
Hamas and its refusal to extradite Palestinian fugitives to Israel conrmed for
many Israelis their presumption that Arafat could not be trusted."
2.2 Arusha
The Hutu seized power after Rwandan independence, and many Tutsi ed to
escape persecution by the Hutu government. Exiled Tutsi in Uganda formed
the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and invaded Rwanda in 1990. In 1991,
Rwanda adopted a multi-party system and the ruling MRNDD Party formed
a coalition with former opposition parties, leaving Habyarimana's government
substantially controlled by hard-line Hutus. Arusha peace negotiations began
in 1992, presided over by moderate Hutu{the members of previous opposition
parties and liberals in the MRNDD. Although Habyarimana's government and
the RPF signed an accord in August 1993, Hutu hard-liners obstructed its im-
plementation (Clapham 1998). Eventually, according to Clapham (1998:204),
\Habyarimana's aircraft was shot down, almost certainly by extremists asso-
ciated with his own party". After this event, genocide against the Tutsi and
moderate Hutu raged on until the RPF seized control of the country.
2.3 Kashmir
After 1988, numerous militant groups formed in the Jammu and Kashmir state
in India, in which majority population is Muslim, to force the region's merger
into Pakistan. The most powerful of those was the Hizbul Mujahideen, sup-
ported by Pakistan and the Jamaat-e-Islami political party. Facing military
pressure from India, Hizbul Mujahideen began negotiations with India and de-
clared a unilateral ceasere in 2000 (Staniland 2012). However, negotiations
collapsed under opposition from other Pakistani factions. Staniland (2012:29)
notes that \Pakistani intelligence services, Kashmiri hard-liners, other jihadi
groups, and even the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami turned on the Hizb and de-
manded it pull back from its peace initiative. This pressure on the Hizb and a
botched negotiation led it to end its ceasere after two weeks."
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3 The Model
Our model describes an internal conict between a government and an opposi-
tion group. We treat the government as a single entity and the opposition group
as a continuum [0; 1] of members.
Government initially possesses WG > 0 quantities of resources (e.x., ter-
ritory, natural resources, and rents from a political power). The opposition
possesses WO  0 quantities of resources, which are evenly distributed among
its members.4
Members of the opposition are heterogeneous with respect to income and
the intensity of antagonism toward the government. We denote the income that
member i 2 [0; 1] earns via production as i and specify that members forfeit
an opportunity to earn income if conict with the government arises. To denote
the degrees of antagonism toward the government, member i 2 [0; 1] receives i
units of utility when he/she takes up arms.
At the time of peace, opposition member i receives income i. In conict,
he/she receives utility i. Therefore, we can dene the antiwar preferences of
member i by i  i   i. That is, i represents the degree to which member
i prefers peace over conict. We denote the cumulative distribution function of
i as F (). Without loss of generality, we assume
8i; j 2 [0; 1]; i > j =) i  j : (1)
We formulate the process of conict and negotiation as follows.5 When at
least one group prefers conict over peace, conict erupts.6 The winner deprives
the loser of fraction D 2 (0; 1) of its resources, but ghting costs both groups
fraction C 2 (0; 1   D] of their own resources.7 Therefore, conict is costly
for both. The cost of conict and the loss from defeat are borne evenly by all
members. The probability that the government wins is denoted by q 2 (0; 1).
Before conict breaks out, negotiation is available. To avoid conict, one
group can oer the other transfer T . Note that positive transfer occurs only
if, when there is no transfer, one group prefers conict and the other prefers
peace. As stated below, we consider the case wherein only the government has
the incentive to oer transfers. Transfer T can not only be a transfer of resources
but also on territory, political concessions, and so on. We assume the resources
4This assumption of even distribution is not essential, because our model allows hetero-
geneity in income.
5The following formulation is based on Jackson and Morelli (2007) and is similar to many
studies on the bargaining model of conict (See, among others, Fearon (1995), Powell (2002),
and Powell (1999)).
6The manner in which the decisions by the opposition group members are aggregated into
the group-wide decision will be explained below.
7We assume C  1   D to ensure that the winner cannot deprive more amounts of the
loser's resources than the remaining amounts after conict.
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derived from the government DWG and transfers T are divided evenly among
recipients. Government's transfer cannot target a subset of the opposition.
When the government oers transfer T , the payo of the government, PG(T ),
is given by
PG(T ) =
(
WG   T if peace.
(1  C)WG   [(1  q)DWG   qDWO] if conict.
(2)
The payo of member i in the opposition group Pi(T ) is given by
Pi(T ) =
(
WO + T + i if peace.
(1  C)WO + [(1  q)DWG   qDWO] + i if conict.
(3)
Let VO  [(1 q)WG qWO]D denote the expected value of resources transferred
from the government to the opposition after conict.
Concerning the parameters above, we assume the following.
Assumption 1. (Ineciency of Conict)
C(WG +WO) +  > ;
where  and  denote the mean values of i and i, respectively.
Assumption 2. If the government makes no transfer, the expected gain of war
exceeds its cost for the average member of the opposition group. That is given
as follows:
VO +  > CWO + :
Assumption 1 means that society's total payo during peacetime exceeds
that during conict. Assumption 2 means that when there is no transfer, the
aggregate payo to the opposition group from conict is greater than that in
peacetime. Therefore, under Assumption 2, barring any transfer, the opposition
chooses war if that decision is made by an agent who maximizes the total payo
to the group.8 When both assumptions hold, the government prefers peace
with no transfers over conict. Consider the situation in which negotiation is
unavailable; therefore, T = 0. From Assumption 1, the total payo to the
society is greater under peace. Nevertheless, from Assumption 2, the opposition
group receives a larger payo from conict. Then, the payo to government
from conict must be less than the payo from peace.
Because the government does not wage war when there is no transfer, the
opposition group has no incentive to oer transfers. Because, in most cases, only
the opposition has an incentive to initiate civil war, these assumptions would
be appropriate.
In summary, we consider the following bargaining process:
8Of course, whether the opposition group decides to wage civil war when T = 0 depends
on the decision making rule.
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1. Government oers transfer T  0 to the opposition (take-it-or-leave-it
oer).
2. The opposition decides whether to accept the oer.
3. If the oer is accepted, the transfer is implemented and civil war is avoided.
If rejected, civil war outbreaks.
Because the members of the opposition have heterogeneous preferences, the
manner in which each member's decision is aggregated into a group decision
is crucial for the equilibrium outcome. The next sections investigate diering
aggregations.
4 Group Decision by a Pivotal Agent
First, we consider that the group's decision is made by a pivotal decision-maker.
We consider two types of pivotal decision-makers. The rst is an agent who
maximizes the aggregate payo to the group, whom we call a group welfare
maximizer. In this case, heterogeneity within the opposition group does not
aect the decision to accept the government's oer. In the absence of private
information, issue indivisibility, commitment problems, or political bias, results
show that civil war is always avoided by negotiation between the government
and the group welfare maximizer (Fearon 1995, Jackson and Morelli 2007).
The second type of pivotal agent is a median voter. In this case, the op-
position makes its decision by the majority rule. Distributions of income and
ideology in the opposition group can aect the outcome of negotiations. Results
show that civil war cannot be avoided by negotiation when the median value
of i is suciently small. As Jackson and Morelli (2007) argue, a dierence of
interests between the pivotal agent and the group causes failure of negotiations.
This section assumes a pivotal decision-maker. More importantly, we as-
sume that the members of the opposition honor the agreement between the
government and the pivotal decision-maker.
4.1 Bargaining with a Group Welfare Maximizer
We assume that the decision of the opposition is made by a group welfare
maximizer who maximizes the total payo of the group. Given the oer T , the
group welfare maximizer accepts the oer if and only if
WO + T +
Z 1
0
(i   i)dF  (1  C)WO + VO: (4)
This condition can be rewritten as
T  TGW  VO   CWO +   : (5)
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From Assumption 2, TGW > 0.
Anticipating the behavior of the group welfare maximizer, the government
oers a transfer in the amount that maximizes its payo:
PG(T ) =
(
WG   T if T  TGW
(1  C)WG   VO otherwise.
(6)
From (5) and (6), we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Assume that the decision of
the opposition group is made by the group welfare maximizer. Then,
 Civil war is always avoided by negotiation.
 The government transfers the TGW of its resources to the opposition.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Consider the payo to
the government by oering transfer T  TGW to avoid war. Since government
seeks an agreement that minimizes transfers, it oers T = TGW . Then, the
payo to the opposition group under the agreement is the same as that under
conict. From Assumption 1, peace increases the society's total payo. This
means that the government receives a larger payo by oering T = TGW than by
accepting civil war. Because conict is socially inecient, negotiations between
the government and the group welfare maximizer can avoid it.
4.2 Bargaining with the Median Voter
Assume that the opposition group's decision is made by the median agent who
has the median value of i. In this situation, the majority rule determines the
opposition group's collective decision. Let m denote the median value of i.
Then, the median agent accepts the oer T if and only if
WO + T + m  (1  C)WO + VO + m: (7)
This condition can be rewritten as
T  TM  VO   CWO + m   m: (8)
Anticipating the median agent's behavior, government oers T to maximize
its payo:
PG(T ) =
(
WG   T if T  TM
(1  C)WG   VO otherwise.
(9)
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The dierence between this case and that involving the group welfare max-
imizer is the amount of the transfer government must oer to avoid conict.
To persuade the median agent, the government must provide a transfer at least
equal to TM . Since TM can be written as
TM = TGW +    m; (10)
the larger the degree by which m falls below , the larger the transfer govern-
ment must provide to avoid conict compared with the case of group welfare
maximizer. When the median agent substantially prefers conict over peace,
the government's cost to avoid conict is very large. Therefore, if m is su-
ciently small, government prefers civil war to avoiding it by providing transfer
TM .
When m  , the transfer government must oer to avoid conict does not
exceed that which it must oer the group welfare maximizer. Therefore, in this
case, civil war is always avoided by negotiation.
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Assume the opposition group's
decision is made by the median agent. Then,
 When m  , civil war is always avoided by negotiation and the govern-
ment provides transfer TM .
 When m <  C(WO +WG), civil war cannot be avoided by negotiation.
 Civil war is likely in these situations:
{ The median agent earns low income in peacetime (m is small) and
obtains a large ideological payo from war (m is large).
{ Resources of each group, WG and WO, are small.
{ The cost of conict C is small.
Proof. See Appendix.
Although civil war is always avoided by negotiation if the pivotal agent is a
group welfare maximizer, negotiation fails when the pivotal agent is the median
agent and his/her net payo from conict is suciently large.
Proposition 2 implies that civil war is likely if within-group income inequality
is large. Given the aggregate (average) level of income , large within-group
income inequality reduces median income m and leads to smaller values of
m. In such a case, the median agent substantially prefers conict over peace
because his/her opportunity cost of conict is small. Because government must
persuade the median agent by oering a large transfer, it prefers civil war over
a peaceful settlement.
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The above discussion presents one explanation for the positive relation be-
tween within-group income inequality and civil war. However, the assumption
of majority rule may be inappropriate in the context of civil war for decisions
by opposition groups are not necessarily determined democratically. Section
5 considers a dierent formulation that associates decisions by each member
of the opposition group with the outcome of peace negotiations. It reects the
lack of disciplined decision-making in the opposition group and provides another
mechanism linking within-group heterogeneity to the outbreak of civil war.
5 Uncertainty about Negotiated Outcomes and
Heterogeneity
In Section 4, members of the opposition group were assumed to honor the agree-
ment between the delegates of the two groups. Thus the prior analysis supposes
a disciplined opposition whose members conform to the leader's decisions. How-
ever, as examples in Section 2 illustrate, the elements of either or both parties
can hinder peace even if their delegates push negotiations. Taking these consid-
erations into account, we abandon the assumption that avoiding conict through
negotiation depends on a pivotal decision-maker. Instead, we assume the like-
lihood that the peace process collapses under disagreement by some members
of the opposition. This assumption reects that the peace process can collapse
if members oppose the government's oer and that collapse is more likely when
opposition is vigorous. This section analyzes how within-group heterogeneity
aects the occurrence of civil war in this environment.
5.1 Probability of Completing a Deal
Consider that the outcome of negotiations is uncertain. As per Section 2, the
process can collapse when a faction within the opposition disavows the agree-
ment its delegate has signed. We describe these situations as follows.
Let n be the number of members of the opposition who accept the govern-
ment's oer. Let p(n) be the probability that the government's oer is accepted
and civil war is avoided when n members agree to it. Naturally, p(0) = 0 and
p(1) = 1.
We also assume that p(n) is continuously dierentiable and that p0 > 0. The
larger the number of opponents, the larger is the eect of their actions. Thus,
the likelihood the peace process avoids conict [p(n)] increases with the number
of members who support it (n).
Note that government confronts the positive probability of civil war when
elements within the opposition reject its oer. If the median agent is the pivotal
agent and all members honor the majority's decision as in Section 4.2, p(n) = 1
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if n > 12 and p(n) = 0 otherwise. However, if the process can collapse when a
faction rejects the government's oer, there is a positive likelihood negotiations
will collapse although the majority accedes.
We can imagine numerous scenarios in which factions opposed to peace derail
negotiations. For example, attacks by dissidents engender hawkish reactions
by the government, as was the case between Israel and the PA. Alternatively,
powerful dissidents may seize the initiative from dovish factions, as the cases of
Arusha and Kashmir indicate.
Concerning probability p(n), we assume the following:
Assumption 3. We assume p(n) is continuously dierentiable and satises
p0 > 0, p00  0, p(0) = 0, and p(1) = 1. Moreover, we assume the elasticity of
p(n) with respect to n is constant. That is
8n 2 [0; 1] p
0(n)n
p(n)
= :
We assume constant elasticity to simplify the analysis and derive a unique
analytical solution. The assumption is not essential for our main results.
5.2 Equilibrium
We assume the following uniform distribution for i:
Assumption 4. The distribution of  is given by
i  U
h
   
2
;  +

2
i
;  > 0:
The density of the distribution is 1=. Parameter  represents the degree of
heterogeneity among the members of the opposition. Larger values for  indicate
greater heterogeneity within the opposition group.
After observing the government's oer T , each member of the opposition
decides whether to accept it. When n members agree, negotiations forestall
civil war with probability p(n).
Opposition member i 2 [0; 1] agrees with the oer if and only if
WO + T + i  (1  C)WO + VO + i: (11)
This can be written as
i  ~(T )  VO   CWO   T; (12)
where ~(T ) represents the threshold value of the antiwar stance when the gov-
ernment oers T . Thus, all members with i  ~(T ) accept oer T and others
do not.
Since member i = 1 has the largest value of , 1 equals  + =2. Similarly,
0 equals    =2. To simplify the analysis, we assume the following:
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Assumption 5. Some members of the opposition prefer peace over conict
irrespective of a government transfer. That is,
~(0) = VO   CWO   + =2 = 1:
Under Assumption 5, some members of the opposition always prefer peace.
Since  < ~(0) from Assumption 2, the majority in the opposition prefers
conict if the government oers no transfer.
Let n(T ) be the number of members who accept government's oer T . Be-
cause all members with i  ~(T ) accept T , from (12), n(T ) can be written
as
n(T ) =
Z 1
~(T )
1

d
= min

1


 +

2
  (VO   CWO   T )

; 1

: (13)
From (13), we derive the number of opposition members who accept the oer
T = 0 as
n0  n(0) = 1


 +

2
  VO + CWO

 0: (14)
If the government's oer satises ~(T )  0, all members of the opposition
accept it and n(T ) = 1. Clearly, oering ~(T ) < 0 is suboptimal for govern-
ment because it can reduce the amount of its transfers without losing opposition
support. Therefore, we consider that ~(T )  0 in the following.
Equation (13) shows an important property of the relation between transfers
and support for peace. When the amount of the transfer increases, threshold
~(T ) decreases and the number of members receptive to the oer increases.
Further, the marginal eect of the transfer on the number of supporters (n) is
inverse to the degree of heterogeneity, as n0(T ) = 1=. Figure 1 shows why its
marginal eect is small when heterogeneity is great. When heterogeneity within
the opposition is large, the density of the distribution of i is small and the shift
of ~(T ) resulting from an increase in T does not signicantly increase support
for the oer. Therefore, support for the government's oer is less responsive to
an increase of transfer when the opposition is more heterogeneous.9
From (13), we derive the function T (n), which represents the transfer amount
necessary to convince that n members of the opposition accept the oer as
T (n) = n+ VO   CWO  

 +

2

; n  n(0): (15)
9This mechanism resembles the probabilistic voting model. See Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996), and Persson and Tabellini (2000). Mizuno et al. (2012)
use a similar mechanism to analyze the relation between inequality and institutions in a
dictatorship.
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
1=
1=
0
~(T )~(T
0
)
An increase in T
Figure 1: The marginal eect of transfer
Following similar logic, the necessary increment in transfer needed to secure a
marginal increase in n is increasing in  as T 0(n) = . When heterogeneity
among the opposition () is large, the eect of T on n is small, and government
must increase T signicantly to secure a denite increase in n. Note that T (n)
is increasing in VO and decreasing in CWO and . This is because the value
of conict for the opposition is increasing in VO and decreasing in CWO and
. Therefore, government must oer a large transfer to gain support in these
situations.
Anticipating the opposition's decision, government determines the amount
of its proposed transfer to maximize its expected payo. Using function T (n),
government's objective function can be written as:
p(n)[WG   T (n)] + (1  p(n))[(1  C)WG   VO]: (16)
We dene R(n)  CWG+VO T (n) as government's peace surplus. When n is
large, government oers a large transfer, and its peace surplus is small. Using
function R(n), government's problem can be written as:
max
n2[n0;1]
p(n)R(n) + (1  C)WG   VO
subject to (15).
Let n be the equilibrium number of opposition group members who accept
the government's oer. We assume n > n0. From the rst-order condition, n
satises:
p0(n)R(n)  p(n)T 0(n)  0 with equality when n < 1. (17)
Government faces a trade-o between the risk of civil war and the size of its
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Figure 2: The negative relationship between n and 
peace surplus.10 An increase in opposition support for its oer reduces the risk
of war, but the larger transfer needed to obtain it reduces peace surplus. The
rst term in (17) is the marginal benet of increasing n and the second term
is the marginal cost. Because T (n0) = 0, government's peace surplus when it
oers no transfer is R(n0) = VO + CWG, which is positive from Assumptions 1
and 2. This means R(n) > 0,11 and condition (17) can be rewritten as
p0(n)n
p(n)
=   n

C(WG +WO) +  + =2  n =  
R0(n)n
R(n)
: (18)
The LHS is the elasticity of the probability p(n), which equals constant  from
Assumption 3. The RHS is the elasticity of government's peace surplus with
respect to n. Since government maximizes the product of p(n) and R(n), it
equalizes these two elasticities.
From (18), we solve for n as
n = min

1;

(1 + )

C(WG +WO) +  +

2

: (19)
When within-group heterogeneity among the opposition () is large, n is small
and the probability of civil war [1   p(n)] is large. Figure 2 illustrates the
relation between  and n.
10Similar risk-return trade-os appear in the bargaining model of conict with asymmetric
information (see Powell 1999). In a model featuring asymmetric information, the probability
of peace is less responsive to the change in transfer amounts when there is great uncertainty
about the opponent's military technology. In contrast, this study shows that support for peace
negotiations is less responsive to a change in transfer amounts when within-group heterogene-
ity is large.
11Since R(n0) > 0, p0 > 0, and p(n0)R(n0)  0, p(n)R(n) takes a positive value if n is
suciently close to n0. Thus, making p(n)R(n) negative is suboptimal for the government.
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Since T 0(n) is increasing in , high degrees of heterogeneity imply that the
government must increase transfers substantially to secure a marginal increase
in n. Because of this eect, the elasticity of the peace surplus is increasing
in . That is, the peace surplus declines sharply as n rises when heterogeneity
within the opposition is large. Therefore, an increase in  shifts the graph of the
elasticity of the peace surplus upward in Figure 2. Because the elasticity of the
probability p(n) is assumed to be constant and independent of , the increase
in  reduces the level of n, as shown in Figure 2.12
The equilibrium number of opposition group members who support govern-
ment's oer (n) increases with the cost of conict C(WG+WO)+  and  (the
elasticity of p). The result is intuitive that an increase in the cost of conict re-
duces the risk of war. A large elasticity of p implies that negotiation by transfer
is more eective. Hence an increase in  reduces the risk of war.
From (15) and (19), we solve for the equilibrium level of transfer oered by
the government as
T  = min

VO   CWO  

   
2

;
VO +
1
1 + 

C(WG  WO) 

 +

2

:
(20)
The relation between T  and  is non-monotonic, as described in Figure 3.
When the within-group heterogeneity  is suciently small, it is optimal for
the government to win over all opposition group members. In this case, an
increase in  increases the amount of the transfer needed to win over the member
12Assuming constant elasticity of p(n) is not crucial for our argument. Even if the elasticity
of p(n) depends on n, an increase in  shifts the graph of elasticity of the peace surplus
upward but does not change the graph of the elasticity of p(n). Therefore, n would decrease
as heterogeneity in the opposition group increases as long as interior solution is guaranteed.
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who most prefers conict. The transfer, therefore, is increasing in  when  is
suciently small ( <  in Figure 3).
When within-group heterogeneity  is suciently large ( >  in Figure 3),
n is an interior solution (i.e., n < 1) and decreasing in  as explained above.
Due to this eect, T  is decreasing in  in this case.
The above argument can be summarized as the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1{5 hold. We also assume the probability that
civil war is avoided by negotiation is represented by the function p(n). In the
case of the interior solution (n < 1), the following results hold:
 Opposition support for government's oer is decreasing in the within-group
heterogeneity (i.e., n is decreasing in ). The risk of civil war 1  p(n)
is therefore increasing in .
 The risk of civil war is small when the cost of conict C(WG +WO) + 
is large.
 The risk of civil war is small when elasticity  is large.
When we consider the corner solution (n = 1), the following result also holds:
 The relation between the transfer oered by government (T ) and  takes
an inverted-U shape.
Proposition 3 says that within-group heterogeneity increases the risk of civil
war because it makes government transfers a less eective tools to avoid con-
ict. Our model provides a possible explanation for the empirical nding that
intra-regional inequality relates positively to the risk of civil conict. More-
over, it helps to understand why peace processes collapse when within-group
heterogeneity is large. Our model examines the onset of civil conict by relat-
ing within-group heterogeneity to the eectiveness of negotiations as a way to
resolve conicts. Accordingly, this paper complements Esteban and Ray (2011),
who relate within-group heterogeneity to conict intensity.
5.3 General Case
In the previous section, we assumed i is uniformly distributed. This section
analyzes the model in more general environments.
Let f and F denote the density and cumulative distribution function of the
distribution of i. Then the number of opposition group members who support
the government oer is given by 1 F (~(T )). For simplicity, assume p(n) = n.13
Then, government's problem can be written as
max
T
n(T )(WG   T ) + [1  n(T )][(1  C)WG   VO]: (21)
13That is, we assume  = 1.
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From the rst-order condition, the optimal level of transfer T  satises
n0(T )R(T ) = n(T ): (22)
The LHS is the marginal benet the government receives from increasing its
oered transfer. It is the product of the increase in the probability of peace and
the peace surplus. As seen in the previous section, in the case of a uniform dis-
tribution, this marginal benet declines with within-group heterogeneity. The
RHS is the marginal cost of raising the transfer oer. An increase in the of-
fered transfer reduces government's payo from peace, which is realized with
probability n(T ).
Equation (22) can be written as
f(~(T ))
1  F (~(T )) =
1
R(T )
: (23)
The LHS is the hazard rate of the distribution at i = ~(T
). Since the RHS
is increasing in T , a unique solution exists when the hazard rate function is
nondecreasing in i.
14 Further, if the hazard rate declines with variance in the
distribution, the relation between degrees of within-group heterogeneity and
risk of civil war is positive. In addition to the uniform distribution analyzed
in the previous section, this property holds under, for example, an exponential
distribution.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1{3 hold. In the general environment de-
scribed above, the risk of civil war relates positively to the degree of within-group
heterogeneity in the unique equilibrium when the hazard rate function of the dis-
tribution of i, f(i)=(1   F (i)), is nondecreasing in i and decreasing in its
variance.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a bargaining model of conict in which government oers
an opposition group a transfer to avoid civil war. Members of the opposition
group are heterogeneous in income and ideology, which engenders disagreement
about accepting the government's oer. We assume the probability that govern-
ment's oer avoids conict increases continuously with the number of members
who accept the oer. When within-group heterogeneity is large, the number of
members who accept government's oer is less responsive to an increase in its
amount. In this situation, government must increase its oer substantially to in-
crease support among the opposition. Peace becomes costly for the government,
and peace negotiations are prone to breakdown.
14Note that ~(T ) is decreasing in T .
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. It is suboptimal for government to oer a transfer larger than TGW .
Therefore, it chooses either oer T = TGW to avoid conict or oer T < TGW
and goes to war. The government oers T = TGW if and only if
WG   TGW  (1  C)WG   VO: (A1)
The LHS is the payo government receives by oering T = TGW to avoid con-
ict. The RHS is government's payo when conict occurs. Condition (A1) can
be rewritten as
C(WG +WO) +     0: (A2)
By Assumption 1, the LHS of (A2) is positive and, therefore, (A2) always holds.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Because it is suboptimal for the government to oer a transfer larger
than TM , it chooses either oers T = TM to avoid conict or oers T < TM and
accepts war. Government oers T = TM if and only if
WG   TM  (1  C)WG   VO: (A3)
This condition can be rewritten as
C(WO +WG) + m  0: (24)
If m  , this condition always holds by Assumption 1. If m is suciently
small such that m <  C(WO +WG), government chooses war. The threshold
 C(WO +WG) is decreasing in C, WO, and WG.
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